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Abstract
Single case studies led to the discovery and phenomenological description
of Gelotophobia and its deﬁnition as the pathological fear of appearing to
social partners as a ridiculous object (Titze 1995, 1996, 1997). The aim of
the present study is to empirically examine the core assumptions about the
fear of being laughed at in a sample comprising a total of 863 clinical and
non-clinical participants. Discriminant function analysis yielded that gelo-
tophobes can be separated from other shame-based neurotics, non-shame-
based neurotics, and controls. Separation was best for statements speciﬁ-
cally describing the gelotophobic symptomatology and less potent for more
general questions describing socially avoidant behaviors. Factor analysis
demonstrates that while Gelotophobia is composed of a set of correlated
elements in homogenous samples, overall the concept is best conceptualized
as unidimensional. Predicted and actual group membership converged well
in a cross-classiﬁcation (approximately 69% of correctly classiﬁed cases).
Overall, it can be concluded that the fear of being laughed at varies tremen-
dously among adults and might hold a key to understanding certain forms
of humorlessness.
Keywords: bullying; Gelotophobia; laughter; mobbing; ridicule.
1. Introduction
Most people have encountered situations in which they were not sure
whether they were the objects of laughter or not. For example, walking
on the street and passing by children who start to laugh after one of
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them apparently says something funny. Or, when people stop talking
just after one enters a room, then some inaudible mumbling followed by
giggles in that group of people. Such co-occurrences can have happened
just by chance and the laughter was not directed at us, or because indeed
we were the target of the humor. We might have given a reason for laugh-
ter (e.g., due to our wearing of a pair of socks of di¤erent colors) or a
prank was played that just needed one person and we were the ﬁrst to
come along. Whether or not we were able to enjoy that situation or an-
noyed about it, most of us would not believe that we are ridiculous in
general.
However, there are also habitual features that can make human beings
long-term or permanent objects of laughter. It may be peculiarities of
physical appearance (e.g., overweight, Dumbo ears, i.e., protruding ears).
Or perhaps be due to deviant behaviors, stuttering, odd habits, misfor-
tunes that happen, slips of the tongue, eccentric views, inﬁrmity, insu‰-
cient achievements and failure. Wearing the wrong clothing, one’s famil-
ial or ethnic background and so forth, or anything deemed to deviate
from the social norm could provide basis for mockery. Humankind has
a history of laughing at the weak; for example, only a few hundred years
ago it was considered to be a weekend entertainment to go to the mental
institutions and watch the imprisoned mentally ill and imbeciles. Physi-
cally deformed people were exposed to paying audiences in traveling
circuses. Mockery in pure form is easily observed in the schoolyard, and
TV shows are often based on ‘‘Schadenfreude’’, i.e., the pleasure taken in
mishaps that befall others.
Descriptions and explanations of derisive laughter exist. It did not go
unnoticed by philosophers and theorists that we don’t only laugh with,
but also laugh at, and laughing at inferiors is an essential ingredient of
the so-called superiority or disparagement theories and their variations
(see, e.g., Martin 1998, 2007). Those theories date back to Plato and Aris-
totle and ﬁnd also support among contemporary researchers (e.g., Gruner
1997). Aristotle, for example, suggested that laughter arises primarily in
response to weakness and ugliness. Thomas Hobbes (1651) stated that
the passion of laughter is nothing else but some sudden glory arising
from some sudden conception of some eminence in ourselves, by compar-
ison with the inﬁrmity of others, or with our own formerly. Typologies of
the comic typically have categories of ridicule, satire, sarcasm, and mock-
ery. Likewise, overt behavior was also described. The unilateral joint con-
traction of the zygomatic major and buccinator muscle is considered to
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be a universal expression of contempt (Ekman and Friesen 1986). Grin-
ning rather than giving a verbal answer to a question is considered an ex-
pression of rejection, and to express scornful and derisive laughter shows
that contempt or disparagement can likewise be expressed at the level of
laughter.
Schmidt-Hidding (1963) traced back the ﬁrst mentioning of laughter in
the German language and found that its occurrence was mentioned dur-
ing festivities but also as part of bloodshed. Ethological literature also of-
fers both explanations. Van Hoo¤ (1972) suggested that the phylogenetic
roots of laughter are in the ‘‘relaxed open mouth display,’’ a common
pattern occurring during play among primate infants. This play face is a
metacommunicative signal, designating the behavior with which it is as-
sociated as mock aggression or play. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1975) postulates a
function di¤erent from the one of van Hoo¤. According to this view
laughter is an action whose function is to correct or to repel deviant or
non-conforming individuals—the e¤ect is a binding function on com-
panions who are laughing together. This is similar to the mobbing e¤ect
observed among birds. Laughter then also might have an educational
aggressive function, which brings outsiders into line and which reinforces
group solidarity and homogeneity. In this view laughter acts as a confor-
mity pressure.
Most of this research focused on the audience of disparagement humor
(cf. Ford and Ferguson 2004; Zillmann 1983) and the personality of the
agent (e.g., cynic hostility). While there is advancement in the understand-
ing of the e¤ects of more good-natured teasing (Keltner et al. 2001), little
attention has been paid to the e¤ects mockery has on the target of deri-
sive laughter. Only one study addressed the e¤ects on bystanders observ-
ing others being ridiculed. Janes and Olson (2000) studied so called ‘‘jeer
pressure’’ and found that witnessing mockery leads to behavior inhibi-
tion, enhanced conformity and reduced creativity among the observers.
There is some research on the e¤ects on the target of mockery. Keltner
(1995) described ‘‘teasing’’ and the smile of embarrassment that it con-
stantly elicits (cf. Keltner et al. 1998; Kruger et al. 2006).
What happens if one is the constant butt of mockery, and what pre-
cisely, if any, are the short- and long-term e¤ects of being laughed at?
However, experimental research on the e¤ects of the more intense deri-
sive laughter or disparagement humor would be unethical and thus one
needs to look for naturally occurring instances, as provided by clinical
observations.
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2. Gelotophobia, the fear of being laughed at
One answer to the above-raised question is provided by the work of
Titze (1995, 1996, 1997). Based on clinical observations, he described pu-
tative long-term e¤ects of early, intense and repeated exposure to mock-
ery and not being taken seriously, coining the terms Gelotophobia (i.e.,
the fear of being laughed at; from gelos ¼ Greek for laughter). According
to Titze (1996), certain patients seem to be primarily concerned with be-
ing laughed at by others, as they are convinced that they are ridiculous
objects.
Titze (1995, 1996, 1997) deﬁnes Gelotophobia as the pathological fear
of appearing to social partners as a ridiculous object. Accordingly, gelo-
tophobes fear exposing themselves to others because those others suppos-
edly are screening them for evidence of ridiculousness, which then leads
to laughter at the patient’s involuntary expense. Gelotophobia at its ex-
treme involves a more or less pronounced paranoid tendency, a marked
sensitivity to o¤ense, and social withdrawal (Titze 1996).
However, Titze deduced his deﬁnition within a clinical realm. While
the present study is based on a distinction of clinical groups it will
be of interest in future studies whether Gelotophobia is of relevance
among non-clinical samples as well. One might think of Gelotophobia
as an individual di¤erences phenomenon. Many persons will experience
some kind of sensitivity towards the laughter and smiling of others in
certain situations but it might be assumed that there is—even in non-
clinical samples—a group of persons that is permanently concerned
with the fear of being laughed at by others. However, gelotophobes have
not learned to appreciate laughter and even smiling in a positive way
(Titze 1996). Therefore they respond, even to positively motivated laugh-
ter and smiling, in a way that indicates their fear of being put down
or being otherwise humiliated by those who face them with laughter or
smiling.
Based on his case-studies Titze (1995, 1996, 1997) describes the origins
and consequences of Gelotophobia. This nomological net of proposed
factors can be illustrated by a diagram (Ruch 2004) depicting a model of
putative causes and consequences of Gelotophobia (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 shows a comprehensive model of putative causes and conse-
quences of Gelotophobia summarizing the theoretical approach by Titze
as can be found in di¤erent sources. The model will not be discussed in
detail but a few important aspects will be highlighted. According to this
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Figure 1. A model of the putative causes and consequences of Gelotophobia as proposed by Titze (Ruch 2004)
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model, repeated traumatic experiences of not being taken seriously (being
laughed at or ridiculed) during childhood and adolescence, and/or in-
tense traumatic experiences of being laughed at or ridiculed during adult-
hood (e.g., bullying), may lead to the development of the fear of being
laughed at. This development is preceded by peculiarities in the early
parent-infant interactions. In this period, some infants are unable to
develop a sense of belonging because they did not experience the feeling
of being loved or appreciated. A major consequence is social withdrawal
to avoid being laughed at or ridiculed. Additionally, those patients lack
liveliness, spontaneity, and joy. They have a low self-esteem and develop
social competences only poorly. In addition to their ‘‘wooden appear-
ance’’ they appear ‘‘cold as ice’’ to others and they are humorless; i.e.,
humor and laughter are not relaxing and joyful social experiences (for a
full description, see Titze 1995, 1996, 1997).
Gelotophobia is related to social phobia and shares common features
(e.g., social withdrawal). The distinguishing feature, however, is their con-
viction of being ridiculous, strange, curious, queer etc. to others and the
expectation of being laughed at. Gelotophobes are convinced that ‘‘some-
thing is wrong’’ with them. This conviction is related to shame about
the presumed shortcomings and inferiorities. Jacoby (1991) related this
conviction with shame in general, however, some patients experience
shame only in specialized areas. This nosological category includes the
core-problem of Gelotophobia, which is based on a distinct experience
of shame—which is interpreted by many students of social anxiety and
phobia as embarrassment (Markway et al. 1998).
3. The present study: The empirical veriﬁcation of the Gelotophobia
concept
Titze’s phenomenological studies and clinical observations of patients
yielded a description of Gelotophobia and provided case studies for the
study of its etiology. As such they can be seen as an initial step, albeit
providing a good foundation. Further research is necessary to identify
the phenomenon in other realms of data (e.g., large scale surveys, peer-
report, behavioral observation, physiological data, experiments, semi-
projective tests).
However, the ﬁrst aim is the veriﬁcation of the concept in the clinical
setting based on self-reports of larger samples and groups selected by
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theory. A rationale for the empirical veriﬁcation of the Gelotophobia
concept is set up and discussed next.
First, it is postulated that there exists a dimension ranging from low to
high Gelotophobia, with individuals lacking any fear of being laughed at
at the bottom of the scale and individuals with a fully developed geloto-
phobic symptomatology at the high end of the dimension. The postulate
of a dimension implies that it is assumed that there are gradual di¤erences
among individuals with regard to the number and severity of symptoms
rather than a normal vs. gelotophobic (or healthy vs. ill) dichotomy. In
fact, it is assumed that several groups will assume a di¤erent position on
that dimension in a predictable way (see below).
Second, it is assumed that some behaviors, thoughts, attitudes, and so
forth are speciﬁc for gelotophobes while others may be typical for geloto-
phobes but are shared with other groups. For example, the core of the
symptomatology is to systematically attribute all (even innocent) laughter
as being a weapon used to put the patient down and to be convinced that
one is a ridiculous object that others laugh at for a proper reason. These
can be seen as genuine markers of Gelotophobia. However, avoiding so-
cial situations to prevent negative events from happening is shared with
other nosological categories such as social phobia. Thus, in a comprehen-
sive list of conspicuous behaviors of gelotophobes, some statements will
be exclusive markers of Gelotophobia while others will be equally typical
for related clinical groups as well. In the statistical analyses, those core
statements will help to mark the location and endpoint of the postulated
dimension.
Third, it is proposed that three clinical groups are needed for the em-
pirical veriﬁcation of the Gelotophobia dimension in addition to the con-
trol group of ‘‘normals’’, and those three groups will assume di¤erent
locations on the Gelotophobia dimension. Obviously, in order to assure
utmost presence of the symptomatology, an identiﬁed group of geloto-
phobes is needed to mark the upper end of this dimension. At the mo-
ment the only available valid assessment of Gelotophobia is the clinical
judgment of the creator of this concept. At best, Titze and his team
should provide a group based on their own diagnosis. In this group, the
fear of shame-inducing laughter is most markedly present; i.e., they
should be scoring highest on that dimension. The group next most closely
related, that could be used to demonstrate that Gelotophobia is a sepa-
rate syndrome, is a group of patients with more general shame-bound
problems. Finally, a group of patients for whom shame is not a typical
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problem is required as well. This group, in turn, will be lower in Geloto-
phobia than those with shame problems. While these three groups should
stem from a clinical population (to keep the general conditions compa-
rable) the group of normals may mark the low end of the dimension as
well.
What kinds of clinical groups may be selected? Donald Nathanson’s
(1992) distinction between two types of depression might be helpful and
those two groups will di¤er in Gelotophobia. For Nathanson, ‘‘typical
depression’’ is related to guilt while ‘‘atypical depression’’ is based on
shame. Accordingly, one can predict that atypical depressives will score
high on Gelotophobia, but gelotophobic symptoms may be virtually
absent among the typical depressives. How will gelotophobes compare
to the atypical depressives? Nathanson describes atypical depressions as
‘‘. . . a persistent form of mood disturbance characterized by rejection sen-
sitivity, social phobia, and applause hunger . . . with self-deprecating with-
drawal’’ (1992: 322). In a sense Gelotophobia represents one—frequently
overlooked—facet of shame-based depressions; i.e., gelotophobes are hy-
pothesized to be a subgroup of shame-based neurotics. Therefore one can
predict that, while gelotophobes will not be di¤erent from other shame-
based neurotics in the general shame-related questions, they will score
higher in (or endorse more often) the speciﬁc questions relating to e¤ects
of being ridiculed, to the fear of being laughed at, or to being suspicious
about the motivation(s) behind people’s laughter. Gelotophobia will be
less pertinent or not at all present among the non-shame-based depressed.
One may predict that this group will score as equally low as the control
group of normals. While the sample of adult controls generally should
yield the lowest scores, there may be some high scores as well due to
di¤erent reasons. One reason is that these may be simply unidentiﬁed
(pre-clinical) gelotophobes; another is that their clinical status in studies
is unknown to investigators.
Thus, the prime aim of the present study was to explore whether a set of
content-saturated statements referring to Gelotophobia can discriminate
among three clinical groups, namely gelotophobes, shame-bound neurot-
ics, and non-shame-bound neurotics (in the descending order given), with
the latter group not being di¤erent from a group of normal controls. The
statements allowing that discrimination are expected to be also the ones
that load most highly on the ﬁrst principal component derived from
the intercorrelation of the statements. While further axes might be ex-
tracted, they are expected to be minor and loaded by the more unspeciﬁc
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statements (i.e., symptoms that gelotophobes and shame-based neurotics
might share).
4. Method
4.1. Research participants
4.1.1. Clinical samples. Altogether 368 patients were recruited from
private practices and hospitals. There were 135 males and 232 females
(the gender of one participant was not available) in the ages from 16 to
83 years (M ¼ 40.49 years, SD ¼ 11.00). Ninety-nine were diagnosed as
gelotophobes (G), 166 were neurotics with general shame-bound prob-
lems (S), and 103 formed the group of non-shame-bound neurotics
(NS). Among all of these groups various types of depression dominated.
The three groups did not di¤er from each other with respect to age
(F ½2; 365 ¼ .81; n.s.). Also, there is the same female to male ratio (2:1)
in all samples (including the control group; w2ð3Þ ¼ 2:55; n.s.).
Medical personnel remitting the patients made the initial diagnoses
based on their clinical judgment. In each case, the list of statements was
completed after the diagnosis was made. Psychotherapists working in-
tensively with these patients made the assessment classifying the patients
into gelotophobes, shame-based neurotics and non-shame-based neurot-
ics. They used standardized and predetermined criteria for di¤erentiating
typical depression (¼ based on guilt fantasies) from atypical depression
(¼ based on shame fantasies) as described by Nathanson (1992). The di-
agnosis of Gelotophobia (G) was based on the fact that (a) the respective
shame experiences were not restricted to objective causes in circumscribed
areas of life, (b) the shame experiences were connected with a (poor) self-
evaluation which, regularly, could be reinforced by those social encoun-
ters where laughing or smiling is included, (c) that the respective patient
showed a restrained (sti¤ ) posture, combined with awkward movements,
gaze aversion and other forms of inappropriate behavior. The diagnosis
of general shame (S) was based on the fact that the respective problems
did not reﬂect a person-centered (‘‘narcissistic’’) development, which indi-
cates a speciﬁc disturbance of the patient’s self-esteem.
4.1.2. Control sample. A mixed sample of 495 volunteers and students
(185 males, 383 females) in the ages from 16 to 93 (M ¼ 36.45 years,
SD ¼ 14.23) formed the control group.
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4.2. Instruments
For the subjective assessment of Gelotophobia, a set of 46 statements
describing the gelotophobic phenomenology was generated. Statements
can be assigned to facets derived from Titze (1995, 1996, 1997). These
facets are paranoid sensitivity towards mockery of others (11 statements),
fear of the humor of others (6), critical self-consciousness of their own
bodies (8), critical self-consciousness of their own verbal and non-verbal
communicative functions (5), social withdrawal (4), general response to
the smiling and laughter of others (3), discouragement and envy when
comparing with the humor competence of others (4), and traumatizing
experiences with laughter in the past (5). While some of the statements
formulated are specially referring to the gelotophobic symptomatology
(e.g., facet 1 though 4), others (e.g., facet 5) are prevalent among geloto-
phobes but not speciﬁcally restricted to them; i.e., might be shared with
other groups.
It is assumed that Gelotophobia is a unidimensional concept and these
facets should be helpful for the further description and the structuring of
the concept. However, it is not intended to set up or to explore a multi-
facet model of Gelotophobia. All statements are positively keyed and they
utilize a four-point answer scale (1 ¼ strongly disagree; 2 ¼ moderately
disagree; 3 ¼ moderately agree; 4 ¼ strongly agree). The statements were
preceded by an instruction, and a set of sociodemographic questions were
added after the list of statements.
4.3. Procedure
The medical doctors remitting the patients to the psychologists made the
initial (and traditional) clinical diagnoses. Two clinical psychologists who
worked intensively with these patients provided the assessment classify-
ing them into the three groups (i.e., gelotophobes, shame-based and non-
shame-based neurotics) according to the criteria outlined above. Patients
of the clinical sample were already undergoing treatment when the study
started. They completed the list of statements after having already had
extensive contact with the psychotherapists, and the diagnoses did already
exist. The classiﬁcation into the three groups was done after the ﬁfth
meeting. In all cases the clinical diagnoses and the administration of the
list of statements were done independently from each other.
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The sample of adult volunteers was recruited via advertisements in
newspapers and took part in a large-scale personality study. They were
mailed questionnaires and ﬁlled them in at home in solitude during their
leisure time. They received feedback on group and individual results to
honor their participation. The student samples were recruited by means
of pamphlets. They were tested individually and they were paid for their
services. Testing took place in laboratory rooms in University.
5. Results
5.1. Examination of the speciﬁcity of the Gelotophobia concept
A discriminant function analysis was undertaken with the four groups as
the classiﬁcation variable and the 46 statements as dependent variables.
A forward stepwise analysis was utilized (criterion to enter the function:
F > 3:9, p < :01) and yielded a Wilks’ Lambda of .39 (F ½30; 2398:73 ¼
30:06, p < :01). Ten statements entered the function (Nos. ¼ 23; 22; 26;
38; 18; 43; 40; 39; 1; 15) and three functions were signiﬁcant.
Axis one (Eigenvalue ¼ 1.20; canonical correlation ¼ .74; Wilks’
Lambda ¼ .39; w2 ¼ 769:94, df ¼ 30; p < :01) explained 88.49% of the
variance. Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating vari-
ables and canonical discriminant functions showed that all statements
were involved in the discrimination of the groups along the ﬁrst axis;
the correlations ranged from .18 to .63 with a median of .43. The state-
ments marking this axis stem from all facets; the statements yielding
lower coe‰cients primarily relate to traumatizing experiences with laugh-
ter in the past. Not surprisingly this axis (‘‘Gelotophobia’’) discriminated
among the four groups in the expected way: gelotophobes scored highest
(M ¼ 2.54), followed by shame-bound neurotics (M ¼ .83), non-shame-
bound neurotics (M ¼ .40), and normals (M ¼ .70) with the di¤er-
ences among all groups being signiﬁcant ( p < :01) except for the di¤er-
ences between non-shame-based neurotics and normals ( p ¼ .06). The
same rank order can be found for each single statement. An inspection
of the means for each statement in univariate analyses shows that the
group of gelotophobes always scored numerically higher than the shame-
bound neurotics, which in turn, scored higher than both the non-shame-
bound neurotics and normal controls (the latter two had no systematic
di¤erence). However, the amount of di¤erences between the groups varied
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from statement to statement and therefore one can expect further axes to
appear to account for those deviations from the general pattern.
Axes two and three have in common that they explain only little of the
variance, are bipolar and have no pure markers; i.e., the highly loading
statements also have a strong alignment with the ﬁrst axis. Thus, for an
optimal selection of statements, it might be worthwhile to rotate the entire
system so that the ﬁrst axis moves slightly towards axes two and three.
The second axis (Eigenvalue ¼ .12; canonical correlation ¼ .33; Wilks’
Lambda ¼ .86; w2 ¼ 122:25, df ¼ 18; p < :01) explained 8.83% of the
variance. These correlations ranged from .33 to .48 with a median of
.01. Inspection of the markers of the two poles of the second dimension
gives clariﬁcation to the nature of this dimension. Two criteria were con-
sidered: the means of the four groups in the particular statement and the
content of the statement. The statements with the positive coe‰cients
have two characteristics: ﬁrst, the scores of the gelotophobes were exceed-
ing the other three groups by far, and second, the other three groups were
not very di¤erent from each other (with the mean of the non-shame-
bound neurotics being numerically the lowest). Content-wise, these state-
ments were the ones that speciﬁcally related to the core facet relating to
paranoid sensitivity towards mockery of others (e.g., the belief that one is
appearing ridiculous to others, the suspicion that others laugh at one, and
the avoidance of situations where one could be ridiculed or mocked) and
also the other statements of this core facet have a positive coe‰cient. The
statements with the negative coe‰cients have in common that there are
comparatively small di¤erences between the gelotophobes and shame-
bound neurotics, with both being higher than the group of non-shame-
bound neurotics, which in turn is higher than the controls. Content-wise,
these statements cover the general statements relating to social avoidance
and they stem from di¤erent facets. Overall, this axis discriminated be-
tween the gelotophobes (M ¼ .45) and normals on one hand (M ¼ .17)
(who were not signiﬁcantly di¤erent from each other; p ¼ .11) and the
shame-bound neurotics (M ¼ .56) and the non-shame-bound neurot-
ics (M ¼ .41) on the other (who are again not signiﬁcantly di¤erent;
p ¼ .80).
The third variate (Eigenvalue ¼ .04; canonical correlation ¼ .19;
Wilks’ Lambda ¼ .97; w2 ¼ 29.35, df ¼ 8; p < :01) explained only 2.68%
of the variance. While the coe‰cients did range from .33 to .56 and six
statements had a coe‰cient > absð:20Þ, 40 of the 46 statements had a pos-
itive correlation (mean ¼ .10). Statements with a higher mean tended to
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have higher positive loadings (r ¼ .42, df ¼ 44, p < :01). Thus, this axis
in part emerged because statements have di¤erent means. Content-wise,
it discriminated between the non-shame-bound neurotics (M ¼ .46) on
one hand and both the shame-bound neurotics (M ¼ .21) ( p < :01) and
normals (M ¼ .00) ( p < :01), but not the gelotophobes (M ¼ .11).
This axis was considered to be of neither empirical value (i.e., low per-
centage of explained variance) nor theoretical substance (i.e., irrelevant
to the question of signifying Gelotophobia) and was discarded.
5.2. Discrimination among the clinical groups
In order to examine how well the statements predict group membership
among the three clinical groups, it was decided to conduct the classiﬁca-
tion without the control sample. Again, a discriminant function analysis
was conducted (which yielded highly comparable results which will not
be discussed here). The focus is on the convergence of actual and pre-
dicted group membership. Although the sample size is rather large, cross-
classiﬁcation was attempted, too, in order to consider sample ﬂuctuations.
The classiﬁcation results are given in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that the diagonal contains by far the highest number of
subjects. Thus, overall 68.77% of the cases were correctly classiﬁed, with
the percentage of people per group correctly predicted ranging from 66.46
to 71.57%. Interestingly, none of the gelotophobes was classiﬁed wrongly
Table 1. Classiﬁcation results: predicted vs. actual group membership
Percent G S NS
Original group Correct
Gelotophobes (G) 69.70 69 30 0
Shame-bound neurotics (S) 66.46 20 109 35
Non-shame-bound neurotics (NS) 71.57 1 28 73
Total 68.77 90 167 108
Cross validated group Correct
Gelotophobes (G) 67.68 67 32 0
Shame-bound neurotics (S) 64.02 23 105 36
Non-shame-bound neurotics (NS) 70.59 1 29 72
Total 66.85 91 166 108
N ¼ 350. NS ¼ non-shame-based neurotics (n ¼ 100), S ¼ shame-based neurotics (n ¼ 152),
G ¼ gelotophobes (n ¼ 98).
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as a non-shame-bound neurotic and only one of the non-shame-bound
neurotics was classiﬁed wrongly as gelotophobic. This demonstrates that
the prediction within the groups is relatively accurate. Results of the
cross-classiﬁcation (using the leaving-one-out method) were highly similar.
As before, the percentage of overall correctly classiﬁed groups was good
(66.85%). Between 64.02% and 70.59% of the participants were correctly
predicted per group. Again, only adjacent groups were partly misclassi-
ﬁed but none of the gelotophobes was wrongly classiﬁed as non-shame-
bound neurotic and only one non-shame-bound neurotic was wrongly
classiﬁed as gelotophobic.
5.3. Factor analyses
Principal components analyses were computed for the 46 statements in
di¤erent samples (the total sample, the clinical sample, the gelotophobes,
shame-bound neurotics, and the control sample) separately to see how
many factors are needed to account for their intercorrelations. Typically,
there was one very strong factor and the Scree test suggested the extrac-
tion of three factors (for example, the Eigenvalues for the total sample
were: 18.55, 1.93, 1.51, 1.36, 1.12, and 1.01), which explain 47.81% of
the variance.
All except three statements had loadings higher than .50 on the ﬁrst
unrotated factor (tentatively labeled ‘‘Gelotophobia’’) and these loadings
ranged from .35 to .78 with a mean of .63. The statements yielding lower
coe‰cients primarily relate to traumatizing experiences with laughter in
the past. An ANOVA was performed with the four groups as classiﬁca-
tion variable and factor scores as dependent variables. As expected, the
ﬁrst factor discriminated among the four groups in the expected way
(F ½3; 826 ¼ 253.75, p < :01), with the order being: controls (M ¼ .41),
non-shame-based (NS) (M ¼ .39), shame-based (S) (M ¼ .50), and ge-
lotophobes (G) (M ¼ 1.64). All adjacent groups were highly signiﬁcantly
di¤erent ( p < :01) from each other, except the controls and non-shame-
based neurotics.
Factor 2 seems to be confounded with the di¤erences in item di‰culty;
the correlation between size of loading and means was .62 ( p < :01). Al-
though the overall e¤ect was signiﬁcant (F ½3; 826 ¼ 2.80, p < :05), none
of the di¤erences among the four groups (all psb .12) in the second factor
was signiﬁcant and this factor was discarded from further consideration.
Factor 3 was slightly related to item di‰culty (correlation between size of
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loading was .37; p < :05). This factor yielded a highly signiﬁcant overall
discrimination (F ½3; 826 ¼ 15.70, p < :01); more speciﬁcally, it separated
the controls and gelotophobes on one the hand from the shame-bound
neurotics and non-shame-bound neurotics on the other (all p < :01).
There was a good correspondence between the factor analysis and dis-
criminant analysis; i.e., the covariance among the statements corresponded
to the variance between the groups. In particular, evidence from three
sources suggested that the ﬁrst two axes of the discriminant analysis cor-
responded to axes one and three of the factor analysis. First, the ﬁrst un-
rotated factor did correlate highly with the ﬁrst discriminant axis (r ¼ .91,
df ¼ 828; p < :01) and the third factor with the second discriminant axis
(r ¼ .46, df ¼ 828; p < :01). Second, analyzing the patterns across the
statements, one could see that the loadings on the ﬁrst unrotated factor cor-
relate with the loadings on this ﬁrst discriminant axis (r ¼ .75, df ¼ 44,
p < :01), and the third axis from the factor analysis corresponded very
well with the second discriminant axis (r ¼ .57, df ¼ 44, p < :01). Fi-
nally, the conﬁgurations of the four groups in the two-dimensional space
deﬁned by factor analysis and discriminant analysis were highly equiva-
lent. Figures 2a and 2b show the location of the four groups in the space
deﬁned by (a) the ﬁrst two discriminant axes and (b) the two principal
components, respectively.
Figure 2 shows that the four groups assumed highly comparable loca-
tions in the two spaces, suggesting that the two sets of axes were practi-
cally identical. This suggests also that the variation along the second di-
mension is systematic, and that the same groups and same statements
contributed to that dimension.
While already the ﬁrst axis did allow discriminating the gelotophobes
from the shame-bound neurotics, the second axis contributed to the dis-
crimination of these two groups (albeit to a lesser extent than axis one).
Nevertheless, several reasons suggest maintaining a unidimensional view
of Gelotophobia and to neglect the variation along the second axis.
Firstly, there were no statements that exclusively loaded on the second
axis and loading on the ﬁrst axis was typically higher. Secondly, the one
pole of the second axis simply refers to statements of general contents
(being ridiculed at school, parents used irony and sarcasm as means of
punishment; getting envious or sad when seeing happy people, assuming
one will only be accepted if one is conforming) that don’t discriminate
between gelotophobes and shame-bound neurotics. These are both charac-
teristics that are not desired and it might be best to drop those statements.
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Figure 2. Location of the four groups in a space deﬁned by the ﬁrst two discriminant axes (left; 2a) and by two principal components (right; 2b)
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This would rotate both coordinate systems slightly to the right, giving
more emphasis to the statements that discriminate most strongly between
the gelotophobes on the one hand and the three other groups on the other
(which additionally are less di¤erent from each other).
5.4. Gelotophobia as an individual di¤erences variable
The fact that the statements do allow discrimination among three clinical
groups should not imply that Gelotophobia does not vary among the
group of normal controls. Averaging across all 46 statements, one can
see that the group of normal controls had the largest variance and also
the highest range (2.26) in scores, with the lowest score being 1 and the
highest score being 3.26. As a comparison, the scores of the gelotophobes
ranged from 1.87 to 3.71. Thus, Gelotophobia might well be studied
among random samples of adults.
Is Gelotophobia gender speciﬁc? Correlations were computed between
gender (1 ¼ males, 2 ¼ females) and the average score for the exploration
of gender di¤erences. Gender was not signiﬁcantly related to the factor
scores in the total sample (r ¼ .05, df ¼ 826, n.s.) or in any of the four
groups separately. Correlation coe‰cients ranged from r ¼ .10 for the
shame-based neurotics to r ¼ .06 for the non-shame-based neurotics (all
n.s.). Thus, males and females were equally prone to Gelotophobia. This
is noteworthy as typically there is a gender di¤erence in neurotic symp-
toms. Likewise, age did not seem to have an e¤ect across all groups
(r ¼ .03, df ¼ 859, n.s.). However, among the group of non-shame-based
neurotics, Gelotophobia seemed to decline with age (r ¼ .41, df ¼ 101,
p < :01). ANOVAs with subsequent Sche¤e´ tests yielded a few other
noteworthy ﬁndings. Singles scored higher in Gelotophobia than married
( p < :01) and divorced/separated ( p < :01) participants. Similarly, peo-
ple who live alone in a household score higher than those who live with
someone else ( p < :01), and employed participants had lower scores than
unemployed ( p < :01).
6. Discussion
The prime aim of the present study was to examine whether or not Geloto-
phobia is a distinct new concept and whether its underlying assumptions
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are valid. The results show that the postulated dimension of Gelotopho-
bia may be recovered from both the covariation of statements as well as
the discrimination of groups; i.e., by means of factor analysis as well as
of discriminant function analysis. The di¤erences among groups in terms
of how strongly they are a¤ected by shame problems contribute to the
intercorrelation among the statements reﬂecting the amount of laughter-
induced shame.
Most importantly, this dimension allows distinguishing a group of ge-
lotophobes identiﬁed via clinical assessment from the broader category of
neurotics with shame-bound problems (i.e., the atypical depressives of
Nathanson [1992]) by means of a self-report instrument. This separation
is done both quantitatively and qualitatively. The quantitative separation
is achieved by demonstrating that gelotophobes score signiﬁcantly higher
than shame-based neurotics; the qualitative element refers to the fact that
the separation was done primarily by the core statements relating to the
gelotophobic symptomatology and not (or less) so by the more global
shame related statements (e.g., relating to social withdrawal). Low scorers
on this dimension are neurotics without shame problems (i.e., the typical
depressives) who score as low as a control group of normals from the gen-
eral population.
Thus, within the clinical realm, this dimension distinguishes among
groups di¤ering with respect to how strongly shame is a problem. The
low scorers may be depressed but they don’t have shame fantasies; the
atypical depressed may have a lot of shame-related problems but their
fear of being laughed at does not stand out from those; only the geloto-
phobes are the high scorers as they are convinced that something is wrong
with them and that they are ridiculous to others who enjoy laughing at
them. They fear to be laughed at because of things they are ashamed of.
In this sense, Gelotophobia is a useful new concept as it allows specifying
a sub-group of shame-based neurotics with a speciﬁc core symptomatol-
ogy. It is also distinct (from related, or broader phenomena), as in the
core statements gelotophobes indeed (and even largely so) exceeded the
shame-based neurotics.
The statements not only allowed discriminating signiﬁcantly among the
groups; the separation was also quite good at the level of individual par-
ticipants. Actual and predicted group membership among the three clini-
cal groups converged well. In particular, virtually no participant without
a shame-bound problem was classiﬁed as gelotophobic and vice versa, ge-
lotophobes were not assigned to the patients without shame problems.
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This indicates that at least those two groups can be separated perfectly
from each other.
Gelotophobia also might help to specify a form of social phobia. It
might well be that among social phobics a higher percentage of geloto-
phobes can be found. Thus, including measures of social phobia and con-
ducting studies with diagnosed social phobics is on the schedule for future
research. At the moment, an experiment including social phobics and
their psycho-physiological reaction and motor ability after viewing short
ﬁlm scenes with di¤erent emotional valence is being conducted. However,
it is up to future research to evaluate what features social phobics and ge-
lotophobes might share. It might also be relevant to study Gelotophobia
in relation to bullying and mobbing. Gelotophobia might, in part, result
from or be enhanced by bullying at school or mobbing at work. However,
it might also well be that gelotophobes perceive actions as bullying more
easily than others.
Future research will focus on the exploration of the construct in a non-
clinical realm. What can we expect from the study of Gelotophobia in
non-clinical samples? Gelotophobia varied well among the normal con-
trols and can be considered an individual di¤erence variable. It has a nar-
row scope and we predict that in trait-based models of personality it will
be located somewhere in the high introversion-high emotional lability
quadrant. Thus, we by no means assume that Gelotophobia taps into a
personality domain that is hitherto unexplored; rather we do expect that
it will show correlations with established concepts. However, not every
introvert labile (or high anxious person) will be afraid of being laughed
at, and thus the statements used in the present study might be needed to
provide speciﬁc assessment of the fear of being laughed at.
It will be of interest to test those statements against some criteria. It
can be assumed that in everyday life some persons are notably fearful of
being mocked and some are not. This may or may not be related to the
actual (current or past) frequency of being ridiculed. The statements
used in the survey so far assess the fear of being laughed at, not how often
people are, in fact, ridiculed. It may well be that people exist who were
ridiculed and did not develop Gelotophobia and some do have a high
fear which does not match their actual low level of exposure to mockery.
Keeping this in mind, future research should include studies focusing on
the distinction between (1) persons with high fear of being laughed at and
high frequency of being mocked and (2) persons with high fear of being
laughed at but low frequency of being mocked. The ﬁrst group might be
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called ‘‘realistic’’ gelotophobes, fearing mockery that often comes their
way. The latter group might be considered to be ‘‘pure’’ gelotophobes,
fearing what seldom happens to them. Additionally, another group might
be of interest as well: Persons with low fear of being laughed at and high
frequency of being mocked. These people must be equipped with coping
strategies that allow them to be resilient against being laughed at. This
will require a further exploration of the construct and the construction of
a scale for the measurement of the opposite behavior to Gelotophobia.
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